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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Good-Bye Significant Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After 
Daimler AG v. Bauman,1 Professors Judy M. Cornett and Michael H. Hoffheimer 
identify a number of legal issues that will become the focus of litigation after 
Daimler.2 This Response identifies an additional, perhaps surprising issue that is 
currently being litigated in the wake of Daimler AG v. Bauman. In the lower 
federal courts, defendants who have litigated cases on the merits without raising 
lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense are filing motions to dismiss and 
arguing that they are not subject to general jurisdiction in the forum under 
Daimler’s “at home” standard. The question is whether these defendants have 
waived their jurisdictional defense under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 
because it was “available” to them in 2011 after Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
                                                                                                                     
 * Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law. B.A., Oberlin College; M.P.P., 
Vanderbilt University; J.D., University of Tennessee College of Law. 
 1 Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant Contacts: General 
Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 101 (2015). 
 2 See id. at 136‒55 (stating that the following issues will become the focus of litigation 
after Daimler: whether appointment of an agent for purposes of service of process can 
constitute effective consent to either specific or general jurisdiction, the scope of Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinion, the proper application of Daimler’s comparative approach, the role of 
corporate expectations in general jurisdiction, the identification of “place of incorporation” 
and “principal place of business,” and the “exceptional circumstances” that will render a 
corporation “essentially at home” somewhere other than its place of incorporation and 
principal place of business).  
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Operations, S.A. v. Brown3 was decided.4 This Response explains the doctrine of 
waiver under Rule 12 and examines three cases that have addressed waiver under 
Goodyear and Daimler.5 This Response then asserts that defendants who failed 
to argue that they were not “at home” in the forum after Goodyear waived their 
jurisdictional defense and should not be permitted to raise it under Daimler. 
II. WAIVER OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION AS A DEFENSE UNDER RULE 12 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(1), lack of personal jurisdiction 
is a “threshold defense” that is “waived if [it is] not included in a preliminary 
motion under Rule 12 as required by Rule 12(g) or, if no such motion is made, 
[is] not included in the responsive pleading or an amendment as of right to that 
pleading under Rule 15(a).”6 This Rule is not absolute, however. If the defendant 
omits a personal jurisdiction defense from a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss or a 
responsive pleading because it was unavailable at the time, then he does not 
waive it.7 He can assert the new defense in a second Rule 12(b) motion or in his 
answer,8 but he must raise it “as soon as [its] cognizability is made apparent.”9 
Although the case law in this area is sparse, the courts that have addressed the 
issue have concluded that a defense is unavailable under Rule 12(g)(2) “if its 
                                                                                                                     
 3 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
 4 This issue first came to my attention in an email sent by Professor Kevin M. Clermont 
to the Civil Procedure Listserv on Thursday, Oct. 2, 2014. The discussion on the Listserv 
prompted me to write this Response on the topic of waiver and pointed me towards several 
cases that are cited herein. 
 5 The three cases are (1) Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, 8 
F. Supp. 3d 9 (D.D.C. 2014), (2) American. Fidelity Assurance Co. v. Bank of New York 
Mellon, No. CIV-11-1284-D, 2014 WL 4471606 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 10, 2014), and (3) Gucci 
America, Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 6 5C CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1391, at 498 (2004) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2), (g), (h)(1)). 
 7 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(g)(2) (“Except as provided in Rule 12(h)(2) or (3), a party that 
makes a motion under this rule must not make another motion under this rule raising a 
defense . . . that was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion.”) (emphasis 
added); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1)(A) (stating that a party waives the defense of lack of personal 
jurisdiction by “omitting it from a motion in the circumstances described in Rule 12(g)(2)”); 
see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 1388, at 491 (“A significant qualification on the 
application of Federal Rule 12(g) is that a party is only required to consolidate Rule 12 
defenses and objections that are ‘then available to the party.’”); Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 712 
F.2d 735, 738 (1st Cir. 1983) (stating that the “language of Rule 12(g) logically also applies to 
Rule 12(h) with the result that under that subsection defendants do not waive the defense of 
personal jurisdiction if it was not available at the time they made their first defensive move”). 
 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 1388, at 491‒92 (stating that a party can file a 
second motion to dismiss “based on a defense that he or she did not have reasonable notice of 
at the time that party first filed a motion to dismiss or on a defense that became available only 
after a motion had been made under Rule 12” or “assert the newly revealed defense . . . in the 
responsive pleading”). 
 9 Holzsager v. Valley Hosp., 646 F.2d 792, 796 (2d Cir. 1981). 
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legal basis did not exist at the time of the answer or pre-answer motion.”10 In 
other words, a defendant does not waive a threshold defense where “for all 
practical purposes” binding precedent makes it “impossible” for the defendant to 
raise it in his first response to the complaint.11  
In Holzsager v. Valley Hospital, an oft-cited waiver case, the Second Circuit 
found that the defendant did not waive its personal jurisdiction defense because 
the defense became available only after the U.S. Supreme Court overruled 
controlling Second Circuit authority.12 In Holzsager, the plaintiff sued the 
defendant hospital in 1976 and established jurisdiction over it by attaching an 
insurance policy issued to the defendant by a New York insurance company.13 At 
the time, Seider v. Roth, a decision from the Court of Appeals of New York, 
authorized “the exercise of personal jurisdiction through quasi-in-rem attachment 
of insurance policies issued by resident insurers.”14 Despite criticism of Seider-
type jurisdiction and Supreme Court precedent that called its constitutionality 
into question,15 the Second Circuit reaffirmed Seider in 1978 in O’Connor v. 
Lee-Hy Paving Corp.16 Then, in Rush v. Savchuck, “the Supreme Court declared 
Seider-type attachments unconstitutional.”17  
Shortly thereafter the defendant in Holzsager moved to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, and the plaintiff responded that the defendant had waived 
its jurisdictional defense.18 The Second Circuit first held that the defendant did, 
in fact, timely assert a personal jurisdiction defense that was broad enough to 
include the argument that jurisdiction under Seider was unconstitutional.19 
Nevertheless, the court concluded that even if the defendant had not previously 
raised its personal jurisdiction defense, it would not have waived the defense 
under Rules 12(g) and (h). The court reasoned that the legal basis for the defense 
did not exist until the Supreme Court overruled O’Connor in Rush, and a right 
                                                                                                                     
 10 Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 813 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing 
Holzsager, 646 F.2d at 796; Glater, 712 F.2d at 738–39). 
 11 See id.; Holzsager, 646 F.2d at 793–96; see also Hawknet, Ltd. v. Overseas Shipping 
Agencies, 590 F.3d 87, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2009). In the context of a Rule 60(b) motion for relief 
from a judgment, the First Circuit has similarly held that it “will excuse a party for failing to 
raise a defense only when the defense, if timely asserted, would have been futile under 
binding precedent.” Bennett v. City of Holyoke, 362 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004). Generally, it is 
“futile” to raise a defense “only if (i) at the time of the procedural default, a prior authoritative 
decision indicated that the defense was unavailable, and (ii) the defense became available 
thereafter by way of supervening authority (say, an overruling of the prior decision or a 
legislative clarification).” Id. 
 12 Holzsager, 646 F.2d at 796. 
 13 Id. at 794. 
 14 Id. (citing Seider v. Roth, 216 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1966)). 
 15 Id. at 795 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)). 
 16 Id. (citing O’Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 1034 (1978)). 
 17 Id. (citing Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980)). 
 18 See Holzsager, 646 F.2d at 795. 
 19 Id. at 795–96. 
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that is unknown cannot be waived.20 According to the Second Circuit, “[t]he 
clairvoyance demanded by [the] plaintiff . . . of the [defendant was] inconsistent 
with the doctrine of waiver.”21 
Similarly, in Hawknet, Ltd. v. Overseas Shipping Agencies, a maritime 
attachment lawsuit, the Second Circuit said that “the doctrine of waiver demands 
conscientiousness, not clairvoyance, from parties.”22 In Hawknet, the plaintiff 
argued that the defendant could not raise its personal jurisdiction defense on 
appeal because it had failed to raise it in the district court.23 The court agreed 
with the plaintiff’s argument generally, but held that waiver was inapplicable on 
the facts of the case because controlling Second Circuit precedent had prevented 
the defendant from raising its jurisdictional defense in the district court.24 It was 
not until the Second Circuit overruled that precedent while the Hawknet appeal 
was pending that the defendant had “a new objection to the District Court’s 
jurisdiction over it.”25 In these circumstances, the appellate court concluded that 
the defendant did not waive its personal jurisdiction defense by raising it for the 
first time on appeal.26  
III. WAIVER UNDER GOODYEAR AND DAIMLER: THE CASE LAW 
Currently, the lower federal courts are wrestling with the question of whether 
Daimler AG v. Bauman provides defendants with a jurisdictional defense that 
was unavailable before Daimler was decided on January 14, 2014, or whether 
that defense was waived by the defendants’ failure to quickly assert it after the 
Supreme Court decided Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v. Brown in 
2011. In these cases, the initial complaint was filed long before Daimler was 
decided, but the defendants did not raise personal jurisdiction as a defense. In 
particular, they did not argue that general personal jurisdiction was lacking 
because they were not “at home” in the forum under Goodyear. Then, shortly 
after the decision in Daimler, the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction on the ground that Daimler had changed the law of general 
personal jurisdiction and under Daimler they were not “at home” in the forum. 
The plaintiffs responded that the defendants had waived their defense under Rule 
12(g)(2) by failing to timely assert it.  
In Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, for example, 
the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit on April 18, 2001, against the Palestinian Interim 
Self-Government Authority (PA), the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
and eleven individual defendants in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
                                                                                                                     
 20 See id. at 796 (citing Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 143, 145 (1967)). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Hawknet, Ltd. v. Overseas Shipping Agencies, 590 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 23 Id. at 91 & n.8 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1) for the proposition “that a party can 
waive its right to challenge the district court’s personal jurisdiction over it”).  
 24 See id. at 91–92. 
 25 Id. at 92. 
 26 Id. 
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Columbia.27 The PA and PLO filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, which the district court denied in 2006.28 
They did not formally raise lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense until 
February 10, 2014, when they filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings for 
lack of personal jurisdiction29 and argued that under Daimler “their contacts with 
the District of Columbia [did] not render them ‘at home’” there.30  
Similarly, in American Fidelity Assurance Co. v. Bank of New York Mellon, 
the plaintiff filed suit on November 1, 2011, in the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Oklahoma.31 The defendant moved to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim in response to both the initial and second amended complaints but 
did not raise lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense in either motion.32 The 
court denied the defendants’ second 12(b)(6) motion on December 26, 2013, and 
the defendant filed an answer on January 10, 2014.33 The defendant then moved 
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on March 3, 2014, and argued that 
general jurisdiction was lacking in light of Daimler.34 Like the defendants in 
Gilmore, the defendant in American Fidelity argued that Daimler changed the 
law and created a new legal basis for challenging general personal jurisdiction.35 
More specifically, the defendant in American Fidelity argued that it was subject 
to general jurisdiction in Oklahoma before Daimler because it had continuous 
and systematic contacts with Oklahoma and controlling Tenth Circuit authority 
prevented it from raising general jurisdiction as a defense until after Daimler was 
decided.36 The defendant further argued that it was not subject to general 
jurisdiction in Oklahoma after Daimler because it was neither incorporated nor 
had its principal place of business there.37 
In both Gilmore and American Fidelity, the district courts held that the 
defendants had waived their jurisdictional defense by failing to assert it promptly 
after Goodyear.38 Both courts reasoned first and most significantly that the 
defense of lack of general personal jurisdiction was available to the defendants 
after Goodyear because Goodyear, not Daimler, announced the new “at home” 
rule and the Daimler Court merely applied it.39 Second, both courts found, 
                                                                                                                     
 27 Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 8 F. Supp. 3d 9, 11 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 28 Id. at 12. 
 29 See id. at 12–14. 
 30 Id. at 15. 
 31 Am. Fidelity Assurance Co. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. CIV-11-1284-D, 2014 WL 
4471606, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 10, 2014). 
 32 See id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at *1, *2–3. 
 35 Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 15; Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *1. 
 36 Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *1, *2–3.  
 37 Id. at *2. 
 38 Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 15; Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *5. 
 39 Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 15 (stating that the defendants were “flat-out wrong that 
Daimler was the genesis of the [at home] rule” because that “standard was unmistakably 
announced in Goodyear”); Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *3 (stating that “multiple 
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contrary to the defendants’ arguments, that Justice Sotomayor did not state in her 
concurrence that the “at home” rule itself was novel.40 Rather, she said that the 
majority’s interpretation of the “at home” rule—“namely that a foreign 
defendant’s contacts with the forum must be ‘viewed in comparison to the 
company’s nationwide and worldwide activities,’”—was novel and 
unprecedented.41 This part of the majority’s holding, however, was not at issue in 
either of the district court cases.42 
Finally, both the Gilmore and American Fidelity courts examined the lower 
courts’ treatment of the Goodyear decision. The Gilmore court noted that more 
than 250 federal cases discussed the “at home” standard in the period between 
the Goodyear and Daimler decisions.43 Similarly, the American Fidelity court 
pointed out that the circuit courts have concluded that Daimler reaffirmed 
Goodyear’s “at home” standard for general personal jurisdiction over 
corporations and “have not presumed general jurisdiction is lacking if the 
corporation’s place of incorporation or principal place of business is not in the 
forum state.”44 The American Fidelity court also rejected the defendant’s 
argument that pre-Goodyear Tenth Circuit precedent prevented it from raising its 
jurisdictional defense until after Daimler was decided because controlling circuit 
precedent from 2012 “clearly relie[d] upon the ‘at-home’ standard announced in 
Goodyear” and “existed . . . well before the Supreme Court’s Daimler 
decision.”45 In the end, both the Gilmore and American Fidelity courts held that 
the defendants had forfeited their general personal jurisdiction defenses and 
denied their motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
In contrast, in Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li, the Second Circuit held on 
similar facts that a non-party had not waived its jurisdictional defense.46 In 
Gucci, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
                                                                                                                     
statements by the Court in Daimler demonstrate that the [at home] standard . . . was clearly 
first expressed in Goodyear”). 
 40 Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 15 n.2; Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *4. 
 41 Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 15 n.2 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 770 
(2014)); Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *4. 
 42 See Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 14–15 (noting that the defendants specifically argued 
that their contacts with the forum did not render them at home in the District of Columbia); 
Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *4 (stating that Justice Sotomayor “was addressing a 
holding of the Court not relied upon by [the] Defendant”). 
 43 Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 16. 
 44 Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *4 (citing Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova 
Holding, A.S., 750 F.3d 221, 222 (2d Cir. 2014); Snodgrass v. Berklee Coll. of Music, 559 F. 
App’x 541, 542 (7th Cir. 2014); Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 15). 
 45 Id. 
 46 See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li , 768 F.3d 122, 125‒29, 134‒36 (2d Cir. 2014); see 
also Laydon v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 2015 WL 1499185 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015) (finding 
under Gucci that a 12(b)(2) jurisdictional defense was not available before Daimler, but 
holding that several defendants have nonetheless waived their jurisdictional objection by 
waiting for seven months after Daimler was decided to raise it). 
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District of New York on June 25, 2010.47 The district court issued a preliminary 
injunction that explicitly applied to a non-party foreign bank, and the plaintiffs 
served the bank with the injunction at its New York City branch in July of 
2010.48 In 2011 and 2012, the district court ordered the bank to comply with the 
injunction and denied the bank’s motions to modify the injunction and for 
reconsideration.49 The bank appealed.50 After oral argument in the Second 
Circuit, the Supreme Court decided Daimler and the bank raised the defense of 
lack of personal jurisdiction for the first time.51 Relying on Hawknet, Ltd. v. 
Overseas Shipping Agencies, the Second Circuit held that the bank was not 
subject to general jurisdiction in New York because its contacts were not “so 
continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum.”52 It 
had “only four branch offices in the United States and only a small portion of its 
worldwide business is conducted in New York.”53  
In reaching its decision, the Gucci court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that 
the bank had waived its jurisdictional defense by failing to raise it in the district 
court.54 The court held that the defense was unavailable in the district court 
because it would have been directly contrary to controlling Second Circuit 
precedent for the bank to argue that it was not subject to general personal 
jurisdiction in New York before Daimler was decided.55 The court explained in a 
footnote that Daimler and the Supreme Court’s other general jurisdiction cases 
are applicable to non-parties.56 At the same time, however, the court pointed out 
in a different footnote that the bank was not subject to the waiver provisions in 
Rules 12(g) and (h) because it was a not a “‘party’ that could fail to assert its 
personal jurisdiction defense in an answer or a motion to dismiss.”57  
IV. WAIVER UNDER GOODYEAR AND DAIMLER: AN ANALYSIS 
Gilmore and American Fidelity Assurance Co. raise the intriguing question 
of when the Rule 12 threshold defense of lack of personal jurisdiction should be 
deemed “unavailable” so that failure to raise it in the first response to the 
complaint does not result in its waiver under Rules 12(g) and (h). The limited 
                                                                                                                     
 47 Gucci, 768 F.3d at 126. 
 48 Id. 
 49 See id. at 127–28. 
 50 Id. at 128. 
 51 See id. at 134–35. 
 52 Id. at 135 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 & n.19 (2014)).  
 53 Gucci, 768 F.3d at 135. 
 54 See id. at 135, 136 & n.14. 
 55 See id. at 135–36 (citing Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 93–95 (2d 
Cir. 2000)); Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 57–58 (2d Cir. 1985); 
Dietrich v. Bauer, No. 95 Civ. 7051 (RWS), 2000 WL 1171132, at *4 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 
2000)); see also supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text (discussing Hawknet, Ltd. v. 
Overseas Shipping Agencies). 
 56 Gucci, 768 F.3d at 134 n.13. 
 57 Id. at 136 n.14. 
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circuit case law in this area suggests that this exception to Rule 12’s waiver 
doctrine is applicable only where controlling legal authority makes it impossible 
to raise the defense in a pre-answer motion or answer.58 This standard itself 
suggests that a defense is unavailable under Rule 12 if it would violate Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) for the defendant (or his attorney) to assert it. In 
other words, if the defense is not “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous 
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing 
new law,” then it is “unavailable” and not subject to waiver.59 At the same time, 
however, if a new rule is announced and the controlling authority is overruled or 
called into question, the defendant must assert his jurisdictional defense promptly 
or he will forfeit it.  
The narrow reach of this exception is appropriate given the purpose of Rule 
12’s waiver provisions, “which is the avoidance of time-consuming, piece-meal 
litigation of pre-trial motions.”60 Unless this exception is carefully 
circumscribed, defendants will frequently argue that a threshold defense was 
unavailable to them and therefore their failure to timely raise it should be 
excused. Moreover, there is no reason that a different standard should apply to a 
non-party once the non-party is on notice that it has become a participant in the 
litigation, as the bank in Gucci was once it was served with an injunction. The 
efficiency concerns that drive Rule 12’s waiver provision apply equally to pre-
trial motions by non-parties. 
Under the waiver standard set forth above, the defendants in Gilmore and 
American Fidelity and the non-party bank in Gucci waived their jurisdictional 
defenses by failing to assert them promptly after Goodyear was decided because 
there was no controlling authority that made it impossible for them to raise their 
jurisdictional defenses.61 Indeed, the Goodyear decision provided defendants 
with a legal basis to argue that general jurisdiction was lacking because they 
were not “at home” in the forum.  
Prior to Goodyear, the law regarding general jurisdiction over corporations 
“was so well settled that large corporations . . . did not even challenge general 
jurisdiction over them.”62 Thus, when the lawsuits in Gilmore and American 
Fidelity were filed and the bank in Gucci was served with the injunction, it was 
unlikely that the defendants or the bank could have raised general personal 
                                                                                                                     
 58 See supra notes 12–28 and accompanying text. 
 59 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (stating that when an attorney presents a defense to the court, 
he is certifying that “to the best of [his] knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an 
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,” that the defense is “warranted by existing law or 
by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for 
establishing new law”). 
 60 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 1391, at 506 (quoting Tiernan v. Dunn, 295 F. 
Supp. 1253 (D.R.I. 1969)). 
 61 Although Rule 12 was inapplicable to the non-party bank in Gucci, the Second Circuit 
appeared to apply the Rule 12 waiver standard set forth above when it held that the bank had 
not waived its jurisdictional defense because controlling Second Circuit precedent prevented 
the bank from raising it until after Daimler was decided. See Gucci, 768 F.3d at 135–36. 
 62 Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 2, at 104. 
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jurisdiction as a defense.63 After Goodyear, however, the law was unclear. The 
Goodyear Court “articulated a new standard” and “adopted a more restrictive 
approach” to general jurisdiction when it announced the “at home” rule, but it did 
not explain how narrowly that rule should be applied.64 While the Goodyear 
Court indicated that a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction at its place of 
incorporation and principal place of business, “the opinion did not restrict general 
jurisdiction to those ‘paradigm’ places.”65 Moreover, the Court’s “evaluation of 
the sales” in Goodyear suggested “that the Court might adopt a comparative 
approach under which contacts outside the state might reduce the likelihood that 
a corporation’s in-state activity would constitute a home in the state.”66 Not 
surprisingly “[c]ourts and commentators reached different conclusions about 
whether the place where a corporation was ‘at home’ after Goodyear included 
places where it engaged in substantial activity outside its place of incorporation 
or principal place of business.”67 Given the uncertainty in the law after 
Goodyear, there was no legal authority that made it futile for defendants to raise 
their jurisdictional arguments until after Daimler was decided. 
In contrast, in Holzsager v. Valley Hospital, a case where the Second Circuit 
found that the defendant did not waive its jurisdictional defense under Rule 12, 
the personal jurisdiction doctrine at issue there had been criticized and called into 
question by the Supreme Court but was then reaffirmed by the Second Circuit.68 
Thus, it was impossible for the defendant to raise its personal jurisdiction defense 
until the Supreme Court overruled the controlling Second Circuit authority in 
Rush v. Savchuk.69 Similarly, in Hawknet, Ltd. v. Overseas Shipping Agencies, a 
maritime attachment case cited by the Gucci court, the Second Circuit held that 
controlling precedent made it impossible for the defendant to raise its 
jurisdictional defense until the Second Circuit overruled that case law while the 
Hawknet appeal was pending.70  
In American Fidelity, the defendant tried to argue that pre-Goodyear Tenth 
Circuit authority made it impossible to raise a jurisdictional defense until after 
                                                                                                                     
 63 The district courts in Gilmore and American Fidelity did not identify the defendants’ 
contacts with the forums in those cases, but it seems likely they did not have an argument 
against general personal jurisdiction until after Goodyear was decided. In Gucci, however, it 
was clear that the bank’s contacts with New York subjected it to general jurisdiction there 
under pre-Goodyear authority, and, therefore, it would have been pointless for the bank to 
argue that it was not subject to general jurisdiction until after Goodyear was decided. See 
Gucci, 768 F.3d at 135–36. 
 64 See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 2, at 105–06, 127. 
 65 Id. at 6. The argument that general jurisdiction over corporations should be restricted 
to the place of incorporation and principal place of business originated in the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce’s amicus brief in Goodyear. Id. at 6 n.17. 
 66 Id. at 23. 
 67 Id. at 23 n.60 (citing various sources). 
 68 See supra notes 12–18 and accompanying text. 
 69 See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
 70 See supra notes 22–28 and accompanying text. 
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Daimler was decided.71 The district court rejected the defendant’s argument, 
however, because controlling Tenth Circuit precedent from 2012 “clearly relie[d] 
upon the ‘at-home’ standard.”72 In contrast, in Gucci the Second Circuit held that 
the bank had not waived its jurisdictional defense because it would have been 
directly contrary to controlling Second Circuit authority for the bank to raise it 
pre-Daimler.73 To support this statement, the court cited three pre-Goodyear 
decisions from the Second Circuit that “made it clear that a foreign bank with a 
branch in New York” was subject to general jurisdiction there.74 In one of those 
cases, Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., the Second Circuit concluded 
that general jurisdiction was not available under New York’s long-arm statute but 
did not reach the constitutional issue.75  
Moreover, the Gucci court neglected to cite or discuss the import of Second 
Circuit cases decided in between Goodyear and Daimler that clearly recognized 
the “at home” standard.76 Perhaps most significantly, the Gucci court did not cite 
any Second Circuit cases in between Goodyear and Daimler that applied the at 
home standard and specifically held that a defendant or non-party with contacts 
similar to those of the bank in Gucci was subject to general personal jurisdiction 
in New York. And notably, the court did not mention Sonera Holding B.V. v. 
Cukurova Holding, A.S., a Second Circuit case decided only a few months before 
Gucci in which the court said that both Goodyear and Daimler “make clear that 
even a company’s ‘engage[ment] in a substantial, continuous, and systematic 
course of business’ is alone insufficient to render it at home in a forum.”77 
Thus, despite the pre-Goodyear authority relied upon by the Second Circuit 
in Gucci and contrary to the Gucci court’s holding, it was not impossible for the 
bank to raise a jurisdictional defense after Goodyear. Because the law of general 
jurisdiction over corporations was unclear after Goodyear and it was uncertain 
just how much the Court had narrowed that doctrine, a legal basis existed to 
argue that general jurisdiction was lacking. The bank in Gucci had four branch 
                                                                                                                     
 71 See Am. Fidelity Assurance Co. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. CIV-11-1284-D, 2014 
WL 4471606, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 10, 2014). 
 72 Id. 
 73 See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 135, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 74 Id. at 136 (citing Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 93–95 (2d Cir. 
2000)); see Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 57–58 (2d Cir. 1985); 
Dietrich v. Bauer, No. 95 Civ. 7051 (RWS), 2000 WL 1171132, at *4 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 
2000)). 
 75 Hoffritz, 763 F.2d at 57–58. 
 76 See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 659, 674 (2d. Cir. 2013) 
(quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853–54 
(2011)) (proposing that the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction over a 
corporation is where it is “fairly regarded as at home”); Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese 
Canadian Bank, SAL, 732 F.3d 161, 169 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting the “at home” rule from 
Goodyear); Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 60 n.9 (2d Cir. 
2012) (same). 
 77 Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding, A.S., 750 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014)). 
2015] OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL FURTHERMORE 77 
 
offices in the United States and conducted only a limited amount of its business 
in New York.78 After Goodyear, it was at least arguable on those facts that the 
bank was not “at home” in New York. Put differently, if the bank had raised its 
12(b)(2) jurisdictional defense under Goodyear, it would not have violated Rule 
11(b)(2) because the argument that the court lacked general personal jurisdiction 
over it was warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for extending 
existing law. The defense therefore was available before Daimler was decided.79 
Thus, under the Rule 12 waiver standard the bank in Gucci, like the defendants in 
Gilmore and American Fidelity, waived its jurisdictional argument by failing to 
assert it quickly after Goodyear.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Because Daimler AG v. Bauman was decided over one year ago, the specific 
issue raised by this Response—whether a defendant who failed to raise a general 
personal jurisdiction defense under Goodyear can assert it under Daimler—will 
eventually become moot. Nevertheless, the broader question of when a threshold 
defense is “unavailable” under Rule 12 deserves additional scholarly attention 
given the dearth of case law in this area and especially in light of cases like 
Gucci. Instead of evaluating whether Goodyear made it possible for the bank to 
make a jurisdictional challenge, the Gucci court essentially held that a 
jurisdictional argument was unavailable because no controlling authority 
explicitly held that an entity like the bank was not subject to general jurisdiction 
until Daimler was decided. If courts take this approach to determining whether 
threshold defenses under Rule 12 are unavailable, defendants will be more likely 
to raise these defenses later in litigation and thereby seriously undermine the 
purpose of Rule 12’s waiver doctrine. 
                                                                                                                     
 78 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 79 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). 
